We study a dynamic optimal routing problem, where a controller has to decide to which of two queues should arriving customers (representing packets, messages, call etc...) be sent.
Introduction
We consider in this paper a min-max type optimal control of customers routing into two infinite capacity queues. Whenever a customer arrives, the controller has to decide to which queue it will be sent. The service rate in each queue is known to remain within some interval. However, the presence of customers arriving from other controlled sources as well as congestion phenomena is modeled by allowing the service rate in each queue to depend on the state of the system, and to change in time in a way that is unknown to the router. The goal of the router is to design a strategy that guarantees the best performance under the worst case service conditions. We formulate this problem as a zero-sum stochastic game, where the server, called player 1 (or "nature"), is assumed to play against the router, called player 2. Each player is assumed to have the information of all previous actions of both players as well as the current and past states of the system, namely, the length of the queues.
Our main result is to identify optimal strategies for both players which have a simple structure, which implies that the optimal min-max strategy for the router is easy to implement. We show that the router has an optimal strategy of monotone switching curve type (see [7] ). This strategy has the following monotonicity property. If it is optimal to route a customer to queue 1 for a given length of the queues s = (s 1 , s 2 ), then it is also optimal to route the customer to queue 1 when the length of the queues is t = (t 1 , t 2 ) provided that t 1 s 1 and t 2 s 2 . A similar monotonicity property holds for routing to queue 2. We then identify a worst-case service conditions, for which each server uses a bang-bang strategy, i.e., depending on the state of the system, either the largest or the smallest service rate will be chosen. Moreover, the decision rule for each server, between the highest or lowest service rate, is again characterized by a monotone switching curve strategy.
In order to establish the structure of the optimal strategies we use the following approach. We first identify properties that the value function may have which would imply the desired structure of the optimal strategies. We then use value iteration in order to show that the value function indeed possesses these properties. This approach was used in the past to obtain structural results in several other stochastic games arrising in queueing models. In [1] and [2] optimal threshold and optimal monotone strategies are shown to exist for min-max flow control problems into a single queue with unknown service rate; a similar structure is obtained when service rate is controlled [6] .
In all cases, the property of the value function that induces the structure of the optimal strategies was convexity. A min-max routing problem was considered by Altman and Shimkin [5] , where the router has to decide to which of N queues an arriving customer should be routed. A symmetric setting was considered, where the service rate in all queues are the same. In addition, an extra service capacity was assumed to be allocated to the queues in a way unknown to the router. Routing to the shortest queue was identified as an optimal strategy. The property of the value function that induces the structure of the optimal strategies was Schur-convexity. A related routing problem as well as a scheduling problem was considered by Altman and Koole [3] . In the present paper, the properties that will induce the structure of the optimal strategies are related to supermodularity and convexity.
Structural properties of optimal strategies in queueing systems were also obtained in non-zero sum games using different techniques, see e.g. Hsiao and Lazar [8] , Altman and Shimkin [4] , [5] .
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we solve the finite horizon problem, and in Section 4 we solve the infinite horizon problem.
Generalizations are discussed finally in Section 5.
The model
Consider two infinite queues. Customers arrive to the system according to a Poisson process with rate 0 . Upon arrival of a customer, the router chooses an action 1 or 2, with the interpretation that action i corresponds to routing the customer to queue i. In each queue, customers are served according to the order of FCFS: first come first served. The service duration of a customer in queue i is exponentially distributed with a parameter a 1 (i) that lies in the interval [ 0 , 0 ]. This parameter, called the service rate, may change in time in a way unknown to the router.
At first sight, it seems that in order to model this process as an MDP (Markov Decision Process), the state space should include not only the queues' length, but also the identity of the last event that happens, since, the router can take decisions only at events of arrival of customers, whereas the servers can take decisions at any time. We construct, however, a simpler equivalent MDP model by allowing the router to take decisions at every event. If the router chooses action i at time t, it has the interpretation that if the following event is going to be an arrival, then the customer that will arrive will be routed to queue i. With this interpretation, it will suffice to consider the length of the queues as the state of the system. Let A i s, i = 1, 2 denote the state obtained by an arrival of a customer to queue i when the state was s, and let D i s, i = 1, 2 denote the state obtained by a departure of a customer from queue i when the state was s. If queue i is empty, then we understand
Consider a time interval ∆. The probability to be in state s 0 at time t + ∆ if at time t the state is s and the actions are a 1 , a 2 is given by:
o t h e r w i s e .
We shall use a time discretized model by fixing some small ∆. The action space of the servers (player 1) is the product of the compact intervals
. (Note that although there are two servers, each of which is a controller, they can be considered together as a single player since they have a common objective). An action a in A 1 is thus a two dimensional vector: a = fa(1),a(2)g.
The action space of the router (player 2) is A 2 = f1,2g.
The transition law:
We note that this law of motion is additive [10] : q can be expressed as q(s 0 j s, a 1 , a 2 ) = q 1 (s 0 js,a 1 )+ q(s 0 js,a 2 ) where The immediate payoff: We assume that the payoff r(s, a 1 , a 2 ), which the router has to pay at each step if the state is s and the actions are a 1 , a 2 , is separable, and has the form:
It is composed of a holding cost c, a cost i that depends on the quality of the service at queue i, and an admission cost d i if a customer is to be admitted to queue i. We assume that i (and thus r) are continuous in the actions.
The strategies We refer to [10] for the definition of strategies.
The finite horizon and infinite horizon costs For given strategies f , g for the players and an initial state s, let r n (f , g)(s) be the corresponding expected payoff (that is paid by the router) at stage n. For a fixed discount factor 0 < < 1, we shall consider the finite horizon discounted cost (n; f , g)(
Let v (n; s) and v (s) denote the values of the finite and infinite horizon discounted games, respectively, i.e.,
)(s).
A strategy f that satisfies v (n; s) = inf g (n; f , g)(s) is said to be optimal for player 1 for the finite horizon problem. Optimality for the infinite horizon problem and optimality for player 2 are defined similarly. Since for any fixed finite horizon n and initial state s, only a finite number of states can be reached, it follows that the finite horizon problem is equivalent to a stochastic game with a finite number of states, and the payoffs can thus be considered to be bounded. The existence of a value and of optimal Markov strategies for both players then follows from well known results, see e.g. [9] Theorem 4.1. We show in Section 4 that a value exists also for the infinite horizon problem within the stationary strategies. 3 The finite horizon problem
The structure of optimal strategies and required properties of the value function
Consider a horizon of n steps. Define for all s 2 S v (0, s) = 0, and denote
for m = 0, 1, 2, ..., n.
We shall make use of the following well known tool ([9] Theorem 4.1): (1)
for m = 0, ..., n 1.
(ii) Any Markov strategies f and g for the two players, that use at time k = n m any actions that achieve the max and min in (1) respectively, are optimal.
We first establish a simple sufficient condition for the router to have an optimal strategy of a monotone switching curve type. We say that a strategy is of the monotone switching curve type (see [7] ) if it has the following monotonicity property. It is described by a curve in S with a monotone slope, that separates S into two connected regions, S 1 and S 2 ; there exists two actions, j = 1, 2, such that in region S j it is optimal to use action j, j = 1, 2.
We shall show, in particular, that the router has an optimal nondecreasing switching curve policy, i.e., if it is optimal to route a customer to queue 1 for a given length of the queues s = (s 1 , s 2 ), then it is also optimal to route the customer to queue 1 when the length of the queues is t = (t 1 , t 2 ) provided that t 1 s 1 and t 2 s 2 . (This implies indeed that the curve that separates S1 and S2 is nondecreasing). A similar monotonicity property should hold for routing to queue 2.
Consider the following property that a function z : S IR may possess:
It is easy to see that if v (m, ) satisfies 1 , then there exists an action for the minizer in (1) which has the above monotone switching curve structure.
Next we identify sufficient conditions for a similar structure to exist for optimal service strategies. Consider the following property that a function z : S IR may possess:
It is easy to see that if v (m, ) satisfies 2 , then there exists an action for both maximizers in (1) which are monotone nonincreasing in s. Moreover, if i is convex for some i = 1, 2, then server i has an action achieving the maximum in (1) which is among f i , i g (strategies having this property are called bang-bang strategies). In that case, if v (m, ) satisfies 2 , server i has a nonincreasing monotone switching curve structure (this means in particular that if at some state s server i uses i , then it also uses i for all states t s, componentwise).
Summerizing the above and using Lemma 3.1, we get the following: We note that property 2 is equivalent to the properties of (integer-)convexity of the value function in s i and to supermodularity. Proof. Clearly, v (m, ) are nondecreasing and satisfy 1 and 2 for m = 0. Assume that v (m, ) are nondecreasing and satisfy 1 and 2 for some m = 0, ..., n 1. We show that this implies that v (m+1, ) also satisfies these properties. It suffices to show that both max a2A 1 
The properties of the value function
The last inequality follows for k = l since v (m, ) satisfies 1 (with s 0 = A l s). It holds also for the other two cases (l = i, k = j) and (
where both (3) and (4) 
Indeed, (6) itself is nonnegative since 1 are nonnegative, and since the term in square brackets is nonnegative as v (m, ) satisfies 1 . To see that (7) is nonnegative we distinguish between two cases. If s i is zero (queue i is empty) then D i s = s, and (7) reduces to
. This is nonnegative by the monotonicity of v (m, ). To see that (7) Next we establish 2 . Let k 2 f 1, 2g be an action achieving argmin a S m (a, A i A j s) and let l 2 f 1, 2g be an action achieving argmin a S m (a, s).
since v (m, ) satisfies 2 . A similar argument holds for l = i. It remains to check the case l 6 = i, l 6 = j.
We have
(8) is nonnegative due to 2 , and (9) is nonnegative due to 1 
Indeed, (10) is itself nonnegative due to 2 , and (11) 
again by the monotonicity of v (m, ). 
The infinite horizon problem
Under some mild growth conditions on the immediate cost, optimal stationary exist for both players with the same structure as described in Proposition 3.1. This is summerized in the following: (ii) holds by (13).
Remark 4.1 Using [6] it esaily follows that the results in Proposition 4.1 hold also for the expected
average cost, provided that the following strong stability condition holds instead of (13): < i , i = 1, 2.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we established conditions for obtaining monotonicity properties of strategies, in general, and monotone switching curve type strategies in particular in the context of stochastic games, where we focused on a routing problem. This extends to the game setting methods already known in the context of control, see e.g. [7] . Our results can easily be extended to handle more involved control problems. Indeed, the main results remain valid in the presence of additional uncontrolled Poissonian flows of customers to both queues. Moreover, one may consider a situation where, with some probability, customers have to rerouted to get extra service in one of the queues, as in the model studied by Hajek [7] . Extra controllers have then to be designed to decide to which queue should such customers be rerouted. Assuming that the input router controller, which we considered in our paper, and the new routers have the same common objective, it can again be shown, as in the control case studied by Hajek [7] , that all routers have monotone switching curves strategies.
An interesting observation is that a flow control problem similar to the discrete time flow control models studied in [1, 2] can be considered as a special case of the routing model which we solved.
Indeed, if the holding cost, the admission cost, and the service cost at queue 2 are zero, then the routing problem transforms into a flow control problem into the first queue. (This becomes even more apparent when the service rate in the second queue is extremely high, so that it is almost always empty).
